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Introduction
While the intellectual debate about the exact causes of the crisis in East Asia and the appropriateness of various remedies rages on, one thing that is clear is that the boom-bust cycle in East Asia was caused by foreign bank lending. Indeed, the bulk of the net US$130 billion reversals in capital flows from the four crisis-hit ASEAN economies (Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia) and South Korea, between 1996 and 1998, was due to reversals in net short term lending by commercial banks.
Reversals in portfolio equity investments roughly averaged only US$10 billion during this period (Table 1) . Such large-scale capital withdrawals, curtailment in lending and consequent sharp currency devaluations, inevitably create major collateral damage and dislocations to the domestic financial sectors. Indeed, the closure of troubled financial institutions was a key element of the IMF programs for the crisis-hit economies (Lane and Associates, 1999) . Table 2 provides some evidence of the dominance of banks (and "near-banks") relative to the bond and equity markets in ASEAN. It is this heavy regional dependence on bank intermediation that contributed to the breadth, depth and longevity of the regional crisis.
Insert Table 1 & 2
This being said, the aim of this paper is not to revisit the origin and consequences of the crisis 1 . Rather, the focus here is threefold. First, the issue of "regional contagion" is briefly discussed. This provides the context within which the scope -if not type -of regional cooperation in the financial and macroeconomic spheres may be considered. Second, the main policy initiatives in ASEAN in these areas are highlighted. Third, and finally, a concrete policy initiative for regional cooperation in ASEAN and the larger East Asian region is proposed.
Rationale for Regional Cooperation in the Macroeconomic and Financial Spheres 2
The currency crises of the 1990s, and particularly the one to hit ASEAN and the larger East Asian region in 1997-98, seem to be strongly suggestive of the relevance and pervasiveness of contagion or negative spillover effects that are largely regional in scope (thus, also referred to as "neighbourhood effects").
Following Masson (1998) , we may describe "contagion" as a situation where a currency crisis in one economy leads to a jump to a "bad" equilibrium in a "neighbouring"
economy. In other words, the definition of contagion refers to the simultaneous occurrence of currency crises between economies, with a currency collapse in one economy leading to a speculative attack on another (regional) currency. While there is a need to be very precise in defining the term "currency crisis" in empirical analyses, we take it here to involve an actual break of an exchange rate peg and concomitant currency depreciation, or speculative pressure which may not lead to an exchange rate depreciation, but does lead to an international reserve depletion or an interest rate hike.
Thus, in the case of East Asia, while the crisis spread initially from Thailand (following the devaluation of the baht in July 2, 1997), to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines by the end of August that year, the South Korean won depreciated in November. In turn, this had reverberations back to the rest of Southeast Asia. Singapore and Taiwan also experienced "modest" currency depreciations during SeptemberOctober 1997, while Hong Kong's currency board came under severe pressures, resulting in a sharp interest rate hike to maintain the currency peg.
What is less clear, however, are the channels which cause currency crises to be contemporaneous over time. Masson (1998) makes an important distinction between transmission channels that are related to investor sentiment or psychology (which he refers to as "pure contagion") and linkages between countries that are measurable/observable ex-ante (which he refers to as "spillovers" or "inter-relatedness").
He calls common external shocks that impact all regional economies "monsoonal" effects. Masson shows how it is conceptually possible for "pure contagion" to make an economy relatively more vulnerable to a currency crisis. The important point here is that there must exist a range or zone of weakness within which a currency is potentially vulnerable to a speculative attack in the first instance, with pure contagion increasing the zone of vulnerability. This is consistent with the escape clause based (ECB) second generation currency crises models pioneered by Obstfeld (1994) , of which contagion models are a subset.
All ECB models stress that while speculative attacks are not inevitable (on the basis of underlying "fundamentals") 3 , neither are they arbitrary, random or undiscriminating (i.e. unanchored by fundamentals). Rather, there must exist some weaknesses in the economic fundamentals of the economy for an attack to occur, as the credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime is less than perfect. If the economy's fundamentals are either very "good" or very "bad", it will respectively never or always be attacked. Within these two extremes -which imply unique equilibrium (i.e. an attack with close to 0 or 1 probabilities) -there is an intermediate range (grey area). Within this range, there may exist some weaknesses in the economy that are neither strong enough 3 There is no firm consensus yet as to what is meant by "fundamentals". However, empirical analyses have found that the strength of the domestic financial/banking sector, the extent of lending booms, the degree of currency overvaluation, and the size and maturity structure of external debt are among the most important variables to be concerned about (see, for instance, Krueger et al., 1998 and Tornell, 1999) . De Gregario and Valdes (1999) find that the likelihood of a contagious attack is inversely related to the average debt maturity structure.
to completely preclude a speculative attack on the currency, nor sufficiently weak to make an attack unavoidable. Rather, there are a multiplicity of equilibra such that an economy remains on what seems to be a sustainable path ("superior equilibrium"), until some trigger or evidently minor event coalesces market expectations to an 'inferior' equilibrium, that is realised. Thus, shifts in market sentiments could lead to jumps between one equilibra to the other, in the process introducing sharp volatility in financial markets.
Against this analytical background, it is revealing to note that, in almost all crises experiences, the economies initially and worst affected by the crises were also the ones with the worst fundamentals to begin with. This is best illustrated by the Table 3 in the case of the East Asian crisis, where Thailand had the worst fundamentals, followed by Indonesia, which was the most severely impacted by the crisis. Hong Kong and Singapore, which seem to have had the best fundamentals, were the least affected.
Malaysia and the Philippines were somewhere "in between".
Insert Table 3
An important agenda for empirical research is how relevant the various causes of contagion were in the case of the East Asian crisis. In any case, regardless of the exact transmission mechanisms and definitions (Rajan, 2000) This in turn provides the analytical basis for encouraging some sort of "peer pressure", 4 It is easy to show how an initial devaluation could actually prove to be contractionary in the short and medium terms, with the domestic financial and corporate sectors caught in a downward spiral, leading to a sharp discrete decline in the domestic currency following the initial breakdown of the exchange rate peg. This point is developed within a simple "bank-centred" Mundell-Fleming framework .
"club spirit" or broader form of economic cooperation that promotes the pursuit of sustainable and prudent macroeconomic policies in each economy in the region.
Financial and Macroeconomic Cooperation in ASEAN: Existing Policy Initiatives
Since the 1990s, ASEAN has gradually but increasingly been looked upon as a vehicle for deepening regional economic linkages, epitomised by the launch of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1993. Given this shifting focus of ASEAN to economic issues, one would have expected the alliance to play a leading role in regional cooperative initiatives to tackle the crisis. Indeed, in the areas of financial and macroeconomic cooperation, ASEAN has been actively promoting schemes such as the intensified use of ASEAN currencies in regional trade through the creation of a network of Bilateral Payments Arrangement (BPA) and the creation of regional bond markets (Setboonsarng, 1998) . Without minimising the importance of these and other initiatives by ASEAN, undoubtedly, the single most important regional initiative was the endorsement by the ASEAN finance ministers of a regional monitoring system in Manila in November 1997 to complement and supplement the IMF's global surveillance role.
The ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP)
The ASEAN Surveillance Process ( 
Potential Constraints on Effectiveness of the ASP
While the ASP has gotten off the ground, one has to be concerned about how effective it can and will really be for at least three reasons.
The first potential impediment to a well-functioning monitoring mechanism has to do with the lack of transparency in economic data and general public documentation of economic and financial activities in the region. To be sure, the authorities in the region have tended to be less than forthcoming about their economic and financial situations, and have used economic data as a strategic tool rather than a public good. The establishment of benchmarks for timely and accurate data is essential if foreign investors and lenders are to be able to make rational and economically viable decisions with reasonably accurate perceptions of risks and benefits.
The second constraint has to do with the real-politik of ASEAN. Substantial asymmetries in the sizes and levels and stages of economic development of member nations, on the one hand, and the ASEAN policy of strict non-intervention in one another's affairs (economic and particularly political), on the other, may make it extremely difficult to operate a regional surveillance mechanism effectively. This is so, as criticisms of an economy's -misguided and unsustainable economic policies -may be perceived as being incompatible with the "ASEAN spirit". Lastly, notwithstanding assistance from the ADB, there is a question of whether ASEAN has the institutional capacity to develop an effective surveillance mechanism on a regular basis, given its small and poorly financed secretariat in Jakarta and loose and highly decentralised organisational structure.
The above obstacles are indeed very real. For instance, the ASEAN secretary general, Rudolfo Severino, reportedly stated in late 1998 that the ASEAN Secretariat's inability to manage and supervise the mechanism and the reluctance by some member economies to reveal "too much" information and data, have been the primary reasons for the initial slow progress (Nath 1998) . It is doubtful that these issues have been adequately sorted out since then.
Manila Framework
In light of these constraints, the effectiveness of the regional surveillance process might be enhanced if this were extended to include APEC economies. This would provide greater opportunities (and resources) for developing Asia Pacific economies to benefit from the expertise of the more advanced members of APEC. From the perspective of contagion, as noted previously, during the East Asian crisis, the eventual currency crisis in South Korea was in part caused by contagion from ASEAN, the Korean crisis in turn reverberating back to Southeast Asia. Similarly, withdrawals of bank loans by Japan and South Korean banks played an important role in intensifying the crisis in ASEAN (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999 Asia should follow suit, taking the attitude that the greater the transparency and timely availability of information (not just data), the better.
All this being said, one does recognise the need to balance this push towards transparency, on the one hand, and the desire by the regional economies to preserve some degree of confidentiality, on the other 10 . However, as a rule, the bias in the case of ASEAN/APEC at present is clearly towards confidentiality, which is at odds with that of greater disclosure by the international community.
Towards Enhanced Regional Financial and Macroeconomic Cooperation in East Asia
Having noted the major regional initiatives that have been undertaken 11 This is broadly consistent with Plummer's (1998) analysis of the nexus between ASEAN and APEC. Specifically, he noted that: APEC will continue to be "nested" in ASEAN in that the subregional organisation is playing a central role in molding the direction of APEC to be consistent with the goals of ASEAN economic cooperation. The remainder of this section focuses on a single key proposal for regional cooperation.
and third in Tokyo (July 19, 1996 and July 14, 1998) , the second in Shanghai (July 25, 1997), and the fourth in Hong Kong (July 9, 1999) . Each one of these meetings have had a broad theme: the first was on the "means of strengthening central bank cooperation to enhance financial stability and market development in the region"; the second was on "asset prices and (their) impact on monetary policy"; the third on the "relationship between international investment and financial stability"; and the fourth on the "International Financial Architecture"
12
. It was only after the governors started their regular meetings since 1996 that the EMEAP became fairly active (and certainly took on a higher profile), with the establishment of the various Working Groups noted above.
In addition to the Working Groups, following -indeed, spurred on by -the Tequila crisis, substantive steps towards monetary cooperation have been taken by the EMEAP.
For instance, a number of member economies signed a series of bilateral repurchase (repo) agreements in 1995 and 1996. Hong Kong and Singapore also reached an agreement to intervene in foreign exchange markets on behalf of the Bank of Japan (Moreno, 1997) . These creditor regional economies also attempted to help defend the Thai baht for some period before the Bank of Thailand succumbed to the speculative pressures.
A useful starting point for regional macroeconomic and financial cooperation might, therefore, be to expand the scope of the EMEAP itself, rather than establishing an entirely new framework/organisation. This is so for a couple of reasons. One, the region is generally averse towards building new institutions. Two, the EMEAP have close linkages with the BIS and IMF (since the EMEAP is, after all, a body of central bankers).
An appropriate and realistic charter for the EMEAP might be to focus primarily on its original goals of enhancing regional monetary and financial cooperation; exchange and pooling of information; and come to the aid of regional currencies that are susceptible to speculative pressures (Rajan, 2000) .
However, in order to be a more effective deterrent against such attacks (i.e.
monetary defence mechanisms), a monetary facility could be established, with "appropriate" contributions from member economies of the EMEAP, thus ensuring a large pool of available reserves. Ability to access this pool of funds and reduce moral hazard concerns (i.e. ready availability of "easy/cheap money") ought to be conditional on/tied to member economies maintaining some pre-determined standards of macreconomic and financial stability, and, if and when necessary, be willing to subject themselves to peer pressure to undertake necessary policy adjustments 13 . Obviously, such macro-cum-prudential oversight needs to be complemented by both peer review (as defined in fn 5) and an effective regional surveillance process-cum-early warnings system that tracks national, regional and international macroeconomic developments, and facilitates necessary policy corrections in a timely manner. Seen in this light, one could easily envisage the ASP being expanded to include the other non-ASEAN members of the EMEAP and possibly even being housed in the latter
14
. 13 There are a number of other channels and mechanisms through which regional or international support may create moral hazard concerns and the accompanying perverse incentive structures (though many do tend to be exaggerated). No attempt is made in this paper to tackle this subject systematically.
14 We have not directly tackled issues arising from Australia's and New Zealand's membership, i.e. is the facility purely East Asia-focussed (and, if so, which ones), or should it be expanded beyond the EMEAP members to include others in APEC or even non-APEC Asian countries such as India, for that matter (which has been included in the new G-20 forum noted in the next subsection)? The Japanese government, for instance, hosted a "Tokyo Dialogue" in December 1997 among finance ministry officials and central bankers of ASEAN, China, South Korea and India. Would this be an appropriate grouping? The chairman of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council's Financial Market's Development Group (PECC-FMD), Jesus Estanislao (1999a, p.10) has noted: (o)n a functional basis.. (PECC-FMD) ..(has) followed the financial markets in their judgements that in East Asia -as the financial and economic crisis has show -ten economies, have to consult more freely with each other. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are the original ASEAN 5. Japan, China, Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei and South Korea are APEC economies in North East Asia. These economies are the East Asian 10. They are the very core of crisis Asia.
Regional Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Lender of Last Resort
While more contentious, a "beefed up" EMEAP could be seen as a step towards the creation of an Asian BIS. Such a body would ensure the development of region-wide banking and financial sector standards and codes (consistent with international best practices) and monitors their implementation in addition to taking on the role of a de facto regional lender of last resort prior to a crisis (Sasaki, 1996 and Grenville, 1998) 15 .
With a regional body playing a major role in setting and ensuring implementation of such standards, this may engender a greater sense of "ownership" of the standards and norms may be felt by the regional member economies. This stands in sharp contrast to the current situation, where there seems to be a "top-down" approach towards such 15 The Asian BIS concept was put forward initially in 1995 by the former governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, Bernard Fraser. 16 Admittedly, there have been some improvements in representation following the East Asian crisis, with the establishment of the G-20 and other international financial groupings that have included representatives from developing economies in the consultation process (Rajan, 2000) . 17 As noted by Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King (1999) The resources of the regional body can be further consolidated if it negotiates guaranteed lines of credit with private banks on behalf of its member economies in times of distress. This is not unlike the Argentine arrangement, in which the country has entered into an agreement in December 1996 with a group of 13 foreign banks to lend Argentina up to US$6.1 billion against collateral at a premium over the LIBOR rate for a certain "commitment fee". In the case of East Asia, a large part of the pre-crisis lending was by regional -mainly Japanese -banks (Table 4) 20 . Thus, a regional body ought, depending on how they are measured -are wholly inadequate for an ILOLR. Nor are resources on the appropriate scale likely to be forthcoming. Indeed, with the new Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) introduced at the end of 1997, which enables economies to far exceed the conventional quota based limits on borrowing from the IMF, the increased lending activity has created liquidity problems for the institution. For recent discussions of the IMF and the ILLR function, see Fischer (1999) and Giannini (1999) . presumably, to have greater "leverage" over the private banking community and be able to play a more effective coordinating role between them and regional members. Table 4 Common Basket Peg A number of economists have proposed the creation of a common currency basket for East Asian economies (Kusukawa, 1999 and Williamson, 1999a,b) 
Insert
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.
Invariably, such a common currency basket would require greater coordination among participating monetary authorities. Kusukawa (1999) actually goes on to recommend the establishment of a regional body to support the common basket system, possibly some kind of regional monetary facility. The argument in favour of a currency basket is far from settled. For instance, Rajan (1999c) finds that the computed weights of the yen in the optimal baskets of individual economies (using data for 1996-97) seem quite dissimilar, and suggests that individual basket pegs may be preferable for the time being. However, if all the regional economies do pursue such a currency basket regime, it may be the case that, over time, the optimal basket pegs for the regional economies may see a convergence. A common basket may then be economically justifiable and politically tenable. In such a case, the "beefed up" and expanded EMEAP (in terms of functions, membership and resources) might be the natural coordinating monetary authority to deal with such a currency basket regime. 21 Note, the focus is on currency basket not common currency. In light of the turbulence faced by the East Asian economies following the regional crisis, on the one hand, and the seeming successful introduction of the euro by the European Union (EU), on the other, leaders of ASEAN agreed to study the feasibility of a common ASEAN currency system (Announced as part of the latest ASEAN summit meeting in Hanoi and included in the Hanoi Plan of Action, Business Times, Singapore, December 15, 1998) . From an economic standpoint, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) have suggested that East Asia may be as close to -or rather, as far away frombeing an optimum currency area (OCA) as Western Europe. However, the European experience has emphasised the need for strong political will and consensus towards such a policy goal. As they go on to note, such leadership and single-mindedness does not seem to be present in ASEAN or the larger East Asian region at the current time.
Concluding Observations
The first part of this paper provided the analytical basis for enhanced regional cooperation in the spheres of financial and monetary cooperation. The emphasis here was on detailing the various transmission channels leading to regional contagion or negative spillovers, with a speculative attack, and resulting devaluation-induced recession in one economy possibly infecting neighbouring economies. Broadly, a distinction was made between "pure contagion" (i.e. regional spillovers that cannot be accounted for by trade and finance linkages), on the one hand, and "interdependencies"
(which can be accounted for by trade and finance linkages), on the other. It was noted that existing currency crises models of contagion -which require the existence of multiple equilibra -suggest that the regional economies must have some existing weakness in "fundamentals" to be negatively impacted by a currency crisis in a regional economy.
Available theory and evidence does suggest that pure contagion is not random or arbitrary. This underscores the need for the primary focus to be placed squarely on the domestic policy arena. In the ASEAN context, this broadly involves strengthening the financial systems and corporate and industrial structures. However, given the fact that regional interdependencies (whether real or financial) are fairly high in ASEAN, even relatively "strong" regional economies can be and have been affected by crises in the "weaker" neighbouring economies. These geographically concentrated policy externalities suggest the need for some form of regional cooperation in the financial and macroeconomic spheres.
Some might argue that pure contagion may be less important in the future, as investors seem to have differentiated between the regional economies following the crisis (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 1999) . This view is clearly debatable. In any case, indications are that at least regional interdependencies will probably rise significantly in the future, as the stronger economies such as Singapore have sharply escalated their investments in economies such as Thailand, where asset prices remain depreciated
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It was noted that the major initiative to date in ASEAN has been the ASEAN Surveillance Process. It has been suggested that there may be a strong case for shifting the focus from the surveillance of only ASEAN economies to the larger East Asian region. In fact, the Manila Framework, which ASEAN members played an important role in shaping, explicitly set out regional surveillance as one of the goals. However, the failure of both ASEAN and APEC to provide more timely and up-to-date information on the progress and achievements (or lack thereof) of the initiatives, has precluded a detailed evaluation of either of them. The most promising regional surveillance effort (or at least the one on which most information is currently available) seems to be the recently established Regional Economic Monitoring Unit within the ADB.
The paper then shifted focus to the issue of concrete policy proposals for future cooperation. There are no doubt a number of "soft" regional cooperative initiatives of importance that could be taken by the regional economies, in the form of human resource development and training, information gathering and dissemination, experience sharing/policy dialogue, and such. These are fairly uncontroversial and are the specific and detailed focus of Estanislao (1999a) and, therefore, were not dealt with here.
Rather, the focus of this paper was on one substantive/major (and therefore, controversial?) proposal, viz. the expansion of the role of the EMEAP, so as to act as the central coordinating body for regional financial and macroeconomic cooperation. It was suggested that the EMEAP might be the appropriate body within which a regional monetary facility could be established. The primary responsibility would be to assist No doubt, there will be a number of sceptics to such a proposal. It is, however, insufficient to merely find fault with the proposed scheme. Rodrik (1999, p. 3) has argued that:
(a)s long as capital flows remain large relative to the liquid assets held by national governments and are easily reversible, the international economy will be hostage to spectacular boom and bust cycles. Notes: a) assets of banks as a percent of the assets of banks and non-bank financial institutions Sources: Rajan (1999b) For a full list of CIES publications, visit our CIES Web site or write, email or fax to the above address for our List of Publications by CIES Researchers, 1989 
